Global governance and place making: India, internationalism and empire in 1930s London by Legg, Stephen
1Global Governance and Place Making: India,
Internationalism and Empire in 1930s London
Abstract
In this paper I argue that two core components of contemporary British human
geography curricula (global governance and place making) can and should be taught
together. I also argue that materials from the past provide valuable teaching tools in the
present. As such, this paper also makes the case for historical geography. It does this
through examining historical phases of what is now called globalisation. It introduces
geographical perspectives on imperialism and internationalism, two variants of interwar,
modern globalisation. It introduces India as a key site in British history, but argues that
we can understand large scale processes like globalisation through small sites of place-
making, such as international conferences. The Round Table Conference of 1930-32,
during which Indian leaders came to London, is presented as an example of a space and
time in which place-making and global governance came together.
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Historical geographers have built up a substantial body of work teasing out the histories
behind the globalised world we have inherited. It emphasises the networks that connect
the world (of trade, migration, data, and ideas) and the nodes at which these networks
coalesce (in ports, mines, camps, and cities). Such work has drawn upon substantial
research in other disciplines. The sociologist Saskia Sassen, author of the widely cited
classic The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Sassen, 1991), has more recently turned
to an exploration of the way in which our current, global world draws upon ways of
assembling together Territory, Authority, Rights (Sassen, 2006) in ways which can only be
understood through their bases in medieval and early-modern precedents.
In thinking about geography and empire, we have a large amount of scholarship to draw
upon which provokes us to think about globalisation, empire, history and geography
together in complex ways. In this paper I will draw upon research arising out of a
research project entitled “Conferencing the International: A Cultural and Historical
Geography of the Origins of Internationalism, 1919-1939”.1 In response to the aggressive
nationalism behind the Great War of 1914-18, many argued that internationalism held the
key to lasting peace. In the project Professor Mike Heffernan, Dr Jake Hodder and myself
argue that this political and social shift was also a deeply geographical one, based on the
belief that international connections could foster greater understanding of humanity’s
shared interests. We also argue that this internationalist turn allowed new visions of the
world’s geography to emerge, in which white men might not be the sole deciders of that
world’s fate.
The geography of internationalism is often perceived as global. However, at the core of
our methodology is the insistence that the spaces through which we study geographical
phenomenon need not match their scale. Instead, we argue that interwar forms of
internationalisms only became manifest when people came together to debate and plan
1 For more information please see https://researchfeatures.com/2017/11/30/origin-internationalism-1919-
1939-beyond/.
3them and that the main space in which this happened was that of the international
conference. As such, we investigate internationalism through the buildings and cities
which periodically hosted dozens, hundreds even, of delegates who came together to
discuss these new political visions for the planet. This approach draws upon debates in
geography regarding scale and place, as well as from within International Relations
regarding the role of individual’s ‘performances’ of their political roles (Hodder, et al.,
2015).
In this paper I would like to make two arguments that will speak to school geography,
where key elements in both GCSE and A level examination specifications focus on the
international scale (such a globalisation, global governance, global systems and global
connections) and ‘place’ (such as place representation, regeneration of places and
diverse places). The first argument is that the two foci (globalisation and place) can, and
should, be productively taught together. The second is that an historical perspective
presents to us teaching tools with which to help school students understand the
complex ways in which scales intermesh, and in which daunting abstractions like
globalisation are made real, and lived. In this sense the paper passionately advocates the
value of historical geography in supporting geography students’ learning: a key concept
such as globalisation makes more sense when rooted in historical geographical contexts.
Historical geography is more than geographers simply ‘doing’ history! Historical
geographers examine the past with an eye for the connections between places, the role
of boundaries and borders, the significance of representations of past spaces (see the
maps below) and the role of the environment in directing the course of history.
While not a strong component of GCSE or A’Level teaching in the UK, Felix Driver (2013)
has made the case for the strength of the historical geography sub-discipline at British
universities, and has listed some of the themes which we have studied, including:
geography, science and technology; historical geographies of environment; maps, print
and visual culture; and historical GIS. Tellingly, perhaps, the first two themes in Driver’s
list were ‘global historical geographies’ and ‘geography and empire’.
4Historical Geographies of Globalisation
The economic historian AG Hopkins (2003), has suggested that there were four phases
of globalisation:
1. Archaic globalisation (up to 1648/1760): marked by Islamic, African, Chinese, Asian
and, later, European networks that cooperated with, rather than assimilated, each
other.
2. Proto-globalisation (1648/1760-1850): marked by the rise of sovereign states,
recognised in international law, in the context of developing commerce, finance and
early industrialization.
3. Modern, or imperial, globalisation (1850-1950): marked by nation-states exporting
financial and industrial revolutions to the non-European world.
4. Post-colonial globalisation (1950 to present): marked by increasingly intense
transactions between Europe, America and Asia.
Whilst historians and historical geographers have produced rich work across all of these
periods, the third phase (modern) has perhaps too quickly been assumed to be that
solely of the ‘imperial’. The world-making force of imperialism cannot, of course, be
denied, but in this paper I would like to suggest that we also pay attention to the forces
of internationalism that characterised (and hastened) the end of this period.
Imperial globalisation
The period of what Hopkins terms modern globalisation was undoubtedly marked by the
rapid expansion of imperial geographies. The ‘Scramble for Africa’ by European colonial
powers had been adjudicated at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, during which the
continent was carved up between the great colonial powers, including France, Britain,
Portugal, Belgium, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire. Through conferences such as
these the British Empire extended the reach of its colonial possessions, edging closer to
its geographical fantasy of a ‘Cape to Cairo’ stretch of African territory from the
Mediterranean to the Cape of Good Hope (a fantasy fulfilled when Britain secured
trusteeship of Tanganyika as a Mandate after the First World War, see below). Britain
also used imperial conferences to coordinate the activities of its ‘Dominions’, the white
5settler colonies of Canada (and Newfoundland), South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.
The disparate collection of dominions, colonies and sub-empires constituted the British
Empire, which in The Cambridge Modern History Atlas of 1912 was depicted in vibrant pink
(see figure 1, and for an introduction to postcolonialism and geography see Jazeel 2012a).
Figure 1. The World: Colonial Possessions and Commercial Highways, 19102
What makes this map particularly useful is its depiction of a world almost wholly divided
up into the possessions of European powers. Apart from ex-European colonies in South
and Central America, only the Arabian and Chinese blank swathes would fully resist
European ownership, while the USA was the only ex-European colony to transition to the
status here of coloniser (the Philippines). The Mercator projection distortions make the
2 From (Ward, et al., 1912) map 140. With thanks to University of Texas Libraries for this reproduction
(https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/ward_1912/world_1910.jpg).
6picture even more complicated, with the Danish possession of Greenland approximating
the size of Africa (in reality it is c.1/14th the size).
The map also includes many other distortions and omissions. The standardised pink of
the British Empire airbrushes out the hues and tones within the imperial collective. It also
only charts formal, colonial acquisitions, not the zones of imperial influence through
which a state’s independence could be undermined through influence and coercion (such
as through British policies in Argentina, the Ottoman Empire or coastal China). The map
was also very much of its time; this is the pre-War world. After it, many territorial shifts
would take place, including the loss by Germany of its colonies and the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire. While other national boundaries stayed the same, the nature of the
nations within underwent phenomenal change, such as through the nationalist upsurges
in India, Vietnam and Egypt. And, finally, the post-war world saw the emergence of
international institutions which surpassed the scope of Empires in terms of their reach,
even if they did not surpass the influence and coercion of imperial power.
International globalisation
Throughout the nineteenth century, international organisations had emerged which
sought technical and scientific coordination so as to face the challenges of the modern
world, such as telegraph and postal communications or the sanitary health of seamen.
They came to sit alongside traditional diplomatic congresses which had sought to
mediate international tensions between nations and empires (Mazower, 2012). Building
upon both of these traditions, an international institution emerged out of the ashes of
the First World War. Its primary aim was peace and it would pursue this aim through the
fostering of cooperation, international legislation, and learning between its member
states through an international League of Nations. The League was born out of
agreements reached at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the resulting Treaty of
Versailles. It has been a staple of historical scholarship and teaching ever since and it
operates under a condemnatory sign of failure. The American President, Woodrow
Wilson, who pushed for the creation of the League failed to gain support for it in the
USA. Germany was allowed to join the League in 1926 but left in 1933, while the USSR
only gained admittance to the League in 1934 (and was expelled in 1939). Most
7damningly of all, of course, was the outbreak of a Second World War in 1939, marking the
signal failure of the League’s core aim.
Recent scholarship is, however, reassessing the League’s achievements as a brave
proponent of a new internationalism that sought to heal the wounds of the nationalist
and imperialist First World War. It created the world’s largest yet political union; a bold
new form of internationalist globalisation. Cartographically it surpassed the swathes of
pink or blue on the 1910 colonial map, even with the stark white omissions of the USA,
Brazil, the USSR and other countries on the League’s own 1929 map (figure 2). Its
technical and social questions divisions achieved long-lasting international cooperation
regarding campaigns regarding trafficking, refugees, signage, disease and labourer
rights. It presented a forum in which smaller nations could challenge the ambitions of
larger imperial powers, enabling dialogue between Euro-American powers and those of
South America, Africa and Asia. Notably, it held France and Britain to account over their
trusteeship of their ‘Mandates’. These were ex-colonies of possessions of Germany and
the Ottoman Empire which they had ceded as a result of the Paris Peace Conference.
8Figure 2. League of Nations State Members (1929).3
In figure 2 the mandates are just visible, shaded in a dark grey, next to the black territory
of League Members and their Dependencies (on the latter, see below), in the Middle
East, Africa, and the Pacific. But the way in which the mandates were administered has
given pause for thought over the differences between internationalist and imperialist
forms of globalisation. The mandates were divided into three categories, which explicitly
referenced colonialist assumptions about the civilizational development of the
inhabitants and their capacity for self-rule:
 ‘A Mandates’: requiring only administrative advice and assistance (including Syria,
Iraq, and Palestine)
 ‘B Mandates’: administered by the mandatory power to guarantee the “welfare of
the natives” (including Tanganyika, Ruana-Urundi, Kamerun, and Togoland).
 ‘C Mandates’: administered by the mandatory power as part of its territory (including
New Guinea, German Samoa and Nauru in the Pacific, and South West Africa).
For many of the inhabitants of these lands, mandates internationalism felt much like
colonial imperialism (Pedersen, 2015). Likewise, for members of the communist USSR,
the League would have felt like a capitalist club of old Empire states, for whom
supposedly humanitarian internationalism was merely a cloak for the expansion of
western industry and commerce. But perhaps the starkest illustration of the complicity of
imperial and internationalist forms of globalisation within the League of Nations can be
illustrated by reading the distortions, omissions and half-references in the League’s own
1929 map.
The map legend denotes black-shaded territories as “members of the League and
territories under their control”. What this means is that when the great imperial powers
signed the Treaty of Versailles and became founding members of the League of Nations,
they also signed up all their colonial possessions as “dependencies”. As such, the black,
grey and white of the League map actually represents a monochrome and even more
3 From League of Nations (1929) The League of Nations: A Pictorial Survey League of Nations Secretariat,
Information Section, Geneva, pg8 https://www.wdl.org/en/item/11589/.
9totalising view of the world than the 1910 map. Britain’s pink, France’s blue, Belgium’s
orange and Portugal’s green in Africa and beyond were all homogenised into an
international black. This black-washing of the colonial geography of the world was
exposed in a map of 1927, published in a League of Nations textbook for teachers in
South Asia (figure 3, from Hall and Sen, 1927). Here Greenland, Iceland, most of Africa
and much of South-East Asia appear as dependencies. So too does Ceylon, off the south-
east of India. India itself, however, stands in bright yellow. A member state, not a
dependency. The legend of the League map makes this anomaly clear, reminding the
world that only fully self-governing states, colonies or dominions could apply for League
full membership. India was neither.
Figure 3. The World showing the States Members of the League of Nations.
India: Empire-Colony, Superpower, Rebel
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India was, and is, famously known as the ‘Jewel in the Crown’ of the British Empire. It
was its biggest, richest, and most strategic possession. That is where the consensus
ends! Notably, India was not technically a colony (which were represented by the
Colonial Secretary in London). It was an empire within the British Empire (represented
directly in Downing Street’s Cabinet by the Secretary of State for India). And this was
more than a constitutional technicality. India dominated the Indian Ocean Arena. Its
traders, engineers, investors, administrators, architects and soldiers were sought after
and found from South Africa and the east African coastal states to the Middle East and
Burma, and through South-East Asia to Hong Kong and Shanghai. Although part of the
British Empire, it could rightly (if retrospectively) claim to have been an Asian
superpower.
Britain penetrated and came to govern this superpower not initially through conquest or
exploration, but through early seventeenth-century traders seeking access to the vast
wealth of the Mughal Empire’s markets. The East India Company gradually extended its
influence from the port towns it came to dominate (Bombay, Madras and Calcutta)
upstream, taking on the form of a colonial state. Its increasingly aggressive reforms led
to growing discontent, which manifested itself in a great uprising of 1857. Labelled by the
British as a “Sepoy [army subordinate] Mutiny”, many Indians came to know it as “The
First War of Independence”. This rebellion, the largest yet against the British Empire, was
viciously put down and Indian political agitation took more conciliatory forms in the
following years, after the East India Company was disbanded and the Government of
India created in 1858. In 1919-20, 1930-32 and 1942-44 India would once again rebel
against its imperial overlords. The sparking of these rebellions can only be understood
through the context of India’s yellow in figure 3; the internationalist framing for its
nationalist awakening.
India’s activities in the India Ocean Arena, and beyond, had made it party to many of the
large international technical and scientific conventions of the nineteenth-century. It had
never, however, been admitted to the white men’s club diplomatic congresses which
oversaw the political coordination of the world in general, and the British Empire in
specific. The First World War changed all this. India contributed an estimated one million
troops overseas to the war effort, which led to demands for international recognition. As
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a result it was admitted to the Imperial Conference of 1917, alongside representatives of
Britain and the white settler dominions. It went on to attend the Imperial War Cabinet of
1918, and the Peace Conference of 1919. As a signatory of the Versailles Treaty it became
a founding member of the League of Nations. Because all future members would need to
be self-governing, it remained the one and only non-self-governing member (Legg, 2014).
Rather than placating India’s would-be rebels, this international status only seemed to
heighten the contrast with the oppressive colonial rule at home. The anti-colonial
nationalist Indian National Congress pushed for greater reforms than those delivered by
the 1919 Government of India Act and for the suspension of repressive war time
legislation. When they did not come a non-cooperation movement was launched under
the inspiration leadership of ‘Mahatma’ Gandhi. Unable to guarantee the non-violence of
his followers, Gandhi suspended the movement in 1922. Growing frustration at the slow
pace of Indian reforms mounted in the 1920s, which government inquiries did little to
quell. As a result, the British Government announced that in 1930 Indian leaders would be
invited to London for a ‘Round Table Conference’ to discuss India’s future. Congress
leaders demanded Dominion Status, meaning self-government and a degree of
international autonomy, which the British resisted. The conference was a key moment in
the history of Britain as a global power and raised questions about India’s future as an
international player, while in the process changing the way in which London functioned
as a node within networks of modern (imperial and international) globalisation.
The Round Table Conference: Imperialism, Internationalism, and Place
The Round Table Conference sat in three sittings: 12th November 1930- 19th January 1931,
7th September-1st December 1931, and 17th November to 24th December 1932. In protest at
British refusal to consider the question of complete self-rule, Congress boycotted the
first and third meeting, though Gandhi and a small band of staff attended the second.
The conference was simultaneously a local and a global event. I will discuss below how
we consider its internationalism, but we must also recognise the significance of place (for
postcolonial reflections on place making see Jazeel 2012b). London was an imperial and
national capital, to which the very invitation of Indian leaders was exceptional and a
recognition of India’s outstanding importance to the Empire. The conference was
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opened by King-Emperor George V, who in his opening speech recollected visiting India
in 1911 (the only ruling British monarch ever to do so) and welcoming some of the Indian
leaders he had known since then into British soil.
The conference was conducted in St James’s Palace but was opened in the Palace of
Westminster, where the delegates witnessed the full spectacle of British sovereignty.
Before and during the opening of the conference delegates were treated to dinners in
London’s finest hotels, trips to scientific exhibitions, visits to an airshow at Croydon, and
an evening reception at Kensington’s Imperial Institute. Regular delegates received
funding to support their hotel accommodation, while many of the ‘Ruling Princes’ used
their vast wealth to book suites at London’s best hotels (the Ritz, Carlton and Savoy).
The tabloid press went wild for the delegates, especially the Princes, with their dazzling
jewellery, extravagant spending habits, and their impeccable English (see figure 4). When
Gandhi arrived in late 1931 his global superstardom guaranteed a level of attention that
put all others in the shade. Pointedly refusing the official subsidy for his housing needs,
he lodged in the East End with London’s poor in a missionary hall. While these decidedly
local details may seem superficial or incidental, what the delegates did outside the
conference venue decidedly impacted upon their work within. Gandhi’s celebrity gave his
interventions added weight; gossip shared at cocktail parties and at Lyon’s teahouses
forged alliances and divided loyalties; while the accumulative force of Westminster
splendour contributed, over the months, to dulling the rebellious edge of delegates and
pushing them closer to conciliatory compromise. The conference was marked by
compromise, especially for those who were hoping that India would attain “dominion”
status. Early on the consensus was reached that the aim of the conference would be to
create a federal India, focusing attention on restructuring its internal state structure, not
looking out on India’s international standing.
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Figure 4. ‘Representing India’, The Illustrated Weekly of India, 12th October4
How, then, should we consider the conference a space of internationalism? The diversity
of people who had come from all over India mark it out as a node of globalisation for
sure. But we can also look at what people said at the conference for traces of the global
in the local. During the second meeting of the conference the liberal delegate Mr A.
Rangaswami Iyengar, for instance, argued that federation made sense because “…We
4 Image © British Library Board, System number 008625880
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British Indians and Indian States, to all intents and purposes, present the appearance of a
united and self-governing India to the outer world in regard to transactions connected,
for instance, with the League of Nations, with the Imperial Conference…” (India, 1932,
17). Others, however, were scathing of India’s treatment at the international scale.
Gandhi’s colleague Madan Mahan Malaviya commented of India’s membership of the
League: “One would imagine that, after such utterances, India would be placed on a
footing of equality with the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire. India was
indeed made an original Member of the League of Nations, but that was a sort of
comedy that, not having freedom to govern itself, India should be called on to take part
in the discussion and decision of affairs affecting the freedom of other countries” (India,
1932, 48). Whilst Malaviya spoke from the tradition of India as rebel, another delegate
anticipated India’s role as global superpower. At the first sitting of the conference,
labour representative NM Joshi suggested that:
“The tendency to find an international solution to our difficulties is naturally, and
very properly, growing and occupying a wide sphere, and I hope that our
Constitution will be so framed in this Conference that India, as a whole, will be
able to take full benefit of the international action, and India, as a whole, will also
be able to be helpful in the international solution of the difficulties of the world.”
(India, 1931, 105)
Conclusions
After independence in 1947 independent India would strive to reconcile its dual positions
as rebel and superpower. At the 1955 Bandung conference in Java India’s Prime Minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru, positioned the country as a rebel superpower, leading other newly
independent African and Asian nations in the fight to remain non-aligned to either side of
the Cold War. From imperial London to anti-imperial Bandung, conferences present us
with sites in which to see how internationalism and place, the global and the local, make
each other and remake the world. This is a process as prevalent today as ever, whether in
UN debates about nuclear disarmament, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
scientific debates, on UK-EU debates about the shape and consequences of ‘Brexit’. I
hope the examples here outlined have provided some new ways of thinking about global
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governance and changing places together, and of valuing the contribution of historical
geography to the teaching of geography today.5
5 To learn more about our ongoing research please see
http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/interwarconferencing/.
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